As a main component of Internet of Things (IoTs), the wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been widely applied to various areas, including environment monitoring, health monitoring of human body, farming, commercial manufacture, reconnaissance mission in military, and calamity alert etc. Meanwhile, the privacy concerns also arise when the users are required to get the real-time data from the sensor nodes directly. To solve this problem, several user authentication and key agreement schemes with a smart card and a password have been proposed in the past years. However, these schemes are vulnerable to some attacks such as offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack by using attacker's own smart card, sensor node impersonation attack and gateway node bypassing attack. In this paper, we propose an improved scheme which can resist a wide variety of attacks in WSNs. Cryptanalysis and performance analysis show that our scheme can solve the weaknesses of previously proposed schemes and enhance security requirements while maintaining low computational cost.
Introduction
Internet of Things (IoTs) is a novel paradigm and rapidly gains ground in the scenario of modern wireless telecommunications. A variety of pervasive things around us such as radio frequency identification tags, wireless sensor nodes, actuators, and mobile phones, etc., interact with each other and cooperate with their neighbors to reach common goals. US National Intelligence Council foresees that by 2025 internet nodes may reside in everyday things-food packages, furniture, paper documents, and more [1] . Though widespread diffusion of IoTs could contribute invaluably like the present internet to economic development, possible security threats should not be neglected. Towards the IoTs security, current researches mainly focus on three aspects: system security, network security and application security [2] . Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), which are the main component of IoTs, are used to collect data by deploying tens to thousands sensors in the target area [3, 4] . WSNs have been recently applied in all sorts of fields such as environmental monitoring, health monitoring of human body, farming, commercial manufacture, reconnaissance mission in military, and calamity alert [3, 4, 7, 9, 10] . Different from traditional wireless networks, sensor nodes in WSNs work in a limited power, limited storage capacity, limited computing ability, and limited communication ability environment [3, 4, 6, 7, 15, 16] . In general, we send user queries to and receive user queries from gateway node (GW). However, in some specific applications, users are required to get real-time data from sensor nodes directly instead of from the GW [3, 6, 7, 12] . Hence, how to permit only legitimate users to access the WSNs becomes very important.
To ensure the security of WSNs, several user authentication schemes have been proposed in the past decades. In 2006, a dynamic user authentication scheme was proposed by Wong et al. [5] by using only hash functions to improve sensor node's computing efficiency. In 2007, Tseng H. R. et al. [6] pointed out that Wong et al.'s scheme has the vulnerability to replay and forgery attacks, and proposed a dynamic user authentication scheme with low computation cost for WSNs. In 2009, Das [7] , however, demonstrated possible attacks such as many logged-in users with the same login-id threats as well as stolen-verifier attacks in Wong et al.'s scheme. To eliminate these weaknesses, an improved user authentication scheme in WSNs was proposed by Das with the help of a smart card and a password. In the subsequent years, several researchers, however, demonstrated that Das's scheme is still susceptive to some attacks. In 2010, Chen and Shih [11] pointed out that Das's scheme cannot provide mutual authentication between users and GW, and then put forward a mutual authentication scheme between two of the communicating parties which are composed of the user, the GW, and the sensor node. In 2010, He et al. [12] insisted that Das's scheme is susceptive to insider attacks as well as impersonation attacks. In the same year, Khan, M. K. and Alghathbar, K. [10] pointed out that Das's scheme has security weaknesses against GW bypassing attacks as well as privileged-insider attacks. In 2012, Vaidya et al. [13] pointed out that some attacks such as stolen smart card attacks, sensor node impersonation with node capture attacks are possible in Das's scheme, Khan and Alghathbar's scheme, and Chen and Shih's scheme. In addition, he insisted that there is no key agreement in Das's scheme. To overcome the pitfalls in the above mentioned schemes, Vaidya et al. put forward a novel two-factor user authentication scheme with key agreement for WSNs. In 2014, Kim et al. [17] , however, pointed out that Vaidya et at.'s scheme [13] is vulnerable to GW bypassing attacks and user impersonation attacks either using secret data stored in sensor nodes or using an attacker's own smart card. To remedy the security flaws in Vaidya et al.'s scheme [13] , Kim et al. proposed an improved two-factor mutual authentication with key agreement in WSNs by storing secret data in unique cipher text form in each node. However, I-Pin Chang et al. [18] The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of Kim et al.'s scheme. Section 3 is devoted to analyzing the security of Kim et al.'s scheme. An improved scheme is put forward in section 4. Security analysis of the proposed scheme is given in section 5, and performance analysis is followed in section 6. Finally, section 7 gives conclusions of this paper.
Review of Kim et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we first list notations adopted in this paper, and then briefly review Kim et al.'s two-factor authentication and the key agreement scheme for WSNs. Kim et al.'s scheme [17] comprises registration, login, authentication and key agreement, and password change phases, which are described from subsection 2.1 to 2.4. The notations adopted in the remainder of this paper are shown in Table 1 . 
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Fig. 2. Login phase of Kim et al.'s scheme

Authentication and Key Agreement Phase
In this phase, the i U , GW and j S send and receive authentication requests from one another to enable i U and j S to authenticate each other, and to negotiate a secret key. The detailed phases are illustrated in Fig. 3 .
When receiving the authentication request from i U , the GW checks the validity of i T by verifying if ( and then verifies * ? 
Response to query 
Password Change Phase
In the password change phase, i U can change the existing password to a new one without communicating with the GW. 
Security Analysis of Kim et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we give detailed analysis towards the weaknesses of Kim et al.'s authentication and key agreement scheme. From subsection 3.1 to 3.4, four possible attacks are analyzed on the assumption that all messages sent or received between communication parties can be eavesdropped on or intercepted by an attacker. It is also assumed that the data stored in a smart card can be read by an attacker by using side channel attacks [3, 7, 8, 14, 19, 20] .
Offline Password Guessing Attack
Since 
User Impersonation Attack
A legitimate user can act as an attacker and launch a user impersonation attack with his/her own personalized identity a ID and password a pw .The detailed registration and login processes are shown as follows. Step1 a U strives to capture j S , and then extracts j SID and j Xs stored in j S .
Step2 holds, the mutual authentication between i U and a U is completed successfully. and adds _ i X PW to the smart card.
Gateway Node Bypassing Attack
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Login Phase
In login phase, i U inserts his/her smart card into a terminal and inputs * 
Authentication and key Agreement Phase
The authentication and key agreement phase begins when the GW receiving an authentication message from i U . In this phase, sending and receiving authentication request is performed among i U , the GW and j S . The detailed phases are shown as follows. 
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, we first analyze the security of the proposed scheme on the assumptions declared in section 3, and discuss the security of our scheme according to the security requirements stipulated in section 4 of Kim et al.'s scheme [17] . Table 2 shows a security comparison of the proposed scheme with related schemes. 
Performance Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Due to the limited resource of sensor nodes, it's very important to conceive an authentication scheme with low computation and low communication cost in WSNs. In this section, we evaluate the computation and communication cost of the proposed scheme in terms of the number of hash and XOR operations. To give a clear illustration, comparison is performed among related schemes: Das'scheme [7] , Khan [18] . Comparing with Kim et al.'s scheme, our scheme can overcome offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack by using his/her own smart card, sensor node impersonation attack, and gateway node bypassing attack with the increase of 2H operation plus 1X in the registration phase, and 2H plus 2X operations in the login phase, however, and with the decrease of 1X operation in the Authentication and key agreement phase, where H and X represent the number of hash operations and the number of XOR operations, respectively. The detailed comparison results are shown in Table 3 according to the computation and communication cost. 
Conclusions
In this study, we have crypto-analyzed a two-factor mutual authentication with key agreement in WSNs proposed by Kim et al., and demonstrated its vulnerability to offline password guessing attack, user impersonation attack by using his/her own smart card, sensor node impersonation attack and gateway node bypassing attack. To address the security weaknesses in Kim et al.'s scheme, we propose an improved two-factor mutual authentication with key agreement in WSNs. Security analysis and performance comparison show that our scheme can eliminate various weaknesses in the existing user authentication with key agreement schemes in WSNs with negligible increase in computation or communication cost.
